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Abstract
This paper analyzes regimes of currency inconvertibility in the frame-
work of a simple general equilibrium model where an officially-traded good,
a smuggled good and a non-traded good are produced and consumed by residents,
who hold domestic and foreign currency in their portfolios. It is shown that
stability requires the effect of relative prices on demand for traded and
non-traded goods to dominate their effect on asset demands and that a once-
and-for-all devaluation does not change the currency substitution ratio.
To the extent that the monetary authorities wish to change the currency
composition of private financial wealth, a crawling peg is therefore the
appropriate instrument. The direction of change depends on the nature of
expectations about relative asset returns. Under perfect foresight, an
increase in the rate of crawl increases the currency substitution ratio
whereas, if expectations are static, it reduces it.
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The development of private international financial intermediation has
led to an unprecedented growth of trade in assets taking place not only
among industrialized countries but also spreading tosemi—industrialized and
even to some less developed countries. This has provided channelsfor
individuals and organizations to build up foreign exchange balances, so that
they can diversify their portfolios across assets denominated in different
currencies. In response, many governments have attempted to recapture foreign
exchange by offering special advantages to certain types of transactions,
namely the ones where evasion of exchange controls would be easier,like
tourist services and migrants' remittances. Nevertheless, in many countries
with inconvertible currencies, "blackt' markets for foreign exchange have
developed to the point that the relative price between domesticand foreign
money that is determined in these markets mayhave a greater effect on
private capital flows than the "official" rate, withobvious repercussions
on. the balance of payments problem of the country in question.
Restricting the ability to convert national currencyinto foreign exchange
may involve a restriction on international trade,which would therefore tend
to promote factor mobility and trade in assets.Also, even though the—2—
definition of convertibility in the Articles of Agreement of theIMF
only refers to current account transactions, in a world of capital
mobility and flexible exchange rates among major currencies, black
markets for "convertible" currencies will develop whenpolicies toward
current account transactions are divorced from policies withrespect to
capital account transactions.
In this paper, the fruitfulness of the portfolio approach to the
determination of the black market rate in situations ofcurrency incon—
vertibility is suggested in Section 1 by a simple dynamic partial
equilibrium portfolio model. Section 2 develops a portfolio balance
model of a small open economy with three goods and two assets. Onegood
is traded in the official foreign exchange market, another issmuggled
through the black market, and the third is non—traded.' On the other hand,
private financial wealth is composed of domestic and foreign money. Section
3 shows how the temporary equilibrium of the model determines the two
relative prices, where the relative price of the two traded goods is also
the black market premium. Section 4, in turn, shows how equilibrium
determines the long—run equilibrium values of the asset stocks. After
analyzing the perfect foresight path of a simplified version of the model
in Section 5, the paper ends with a brief conclusion.-3.-
2. A dynamic partial equilibrium model of the black market for foreign exchange
Consider a country whose residents are not authorized to hold foreign
assets, but who nevertheless allocate their financial wealth between domestic
and foreign currency. If foreigners do not hold the inconvertible domestic
currency in their portfolios, then, the domestic currency price of foreign
currency in the black market will be such that the existing stock is willingly
held. Furthermore, the only way for domestic residents to acquire foreign
currency is through the underinvoicing or smuggling of exports and through
the overinvoicing of imports. Under a fixed official exchange rate and in
the absence of endogenous reported capital flows and errors and omissions,
as well as interest payments on unrecorded capital flows, the two balances
will give the change in the stock of foreign currency of the private sector
and the central bank respectively. Assuming that the relevant "elasticities
condition" holds, on the other hand, will imply that an increase in the black
market (official) exchange rate will improve the unreported (reported) trade
balance. If the shares traded through each market also respond to the black
market premium, the black market (official) rate will also deteriorate the
reported (unreported) trade balance, but by less.2 Under these conditions,
the difference between output and expenditurewhich equals the sum of the
two trade balances -willbe lowered by the increase in either one of the
exchange rates.
Ignoring the monetary consequences of the reported trade deficit, this
system can be illustrated by a variant of the Kouri (1983) diagram, as in
Figure 1. The left panel shows the instantaneous determination of the black
market exchange rate, given demand for foreign currency and no expected
change in relative returns, along a rectangular hyperbola PP. Under a
perfect foresight, demand for foreign currency will increase when the
black market rate depreciates, constraining its initial value for a-4-
given stock of foreign currency F to e', on the saddlepath S (below the
corresponding initial value under static expectations,e0). For a given offi—
cial exchange rate, (< e), the left panel of Figure 1 plots the unreported
trade surplus in foreigncurrency, B (which equals to the increase in F) as
well as the exogenous reported trade deficit, —.Assuminga stronger effect
of the black market rate on B, the -locuswill have a steeper slop and the
total trade balancewill be upward sloping. For simplicity assume that B is
zero initially but that the unreported trade balance equilibriumassociated
with the given official exchange rate is e*. If theassociated reported deficit
is corrected by a devaluation of the officialexchange rate to its long—run
equilibrium level, j, the three schedules will shiftup and intersect on the
vertical axis at a point where, by choice of units,e =. Theimplications of
the offical devaluation differ depending on theexpectations formation mechanism.
If expectations are static, the blackmarket exchange rate will gradually
depreciate from e0 to e1 as the stock offoreign assets decreases fromF0 to
F1. If expectations are rational the black marketrate jumps from e to e.
and thengradually depreciates to thesame long-run value, If the official
devaluation generates an increase in the demandfor foreign assets from
PP to PP, furthermore, the black marketrate will overshoot toe2(e under
perfect foresight) and gradually appreciateas the stock of foreign assets
increases to F.
This analysis remains applicable when theofficial exchange rate, rather
than being fixed, is set by the central bankaccording to the "acceleration
hypothesis", so that it depreciates at a rategiven by the rate of the re-
ported trade balance over the stock of foreign assets ofthe central bank.3
To analyze the effect of anexogenously given rate of crawl, however, the-5-
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tradebalances have to respond to the black market premium rather than to
the levels of the two rates and this is best handled in thegeneral equili-
brium framework of the next section.
3.A three-good two-asset model of currency inconvertibility
Whilesomebasic features of the black market for foreign exchange can
be derived from a straightforward extension of the Kouri (1983)partial
equilibrium analysis, as done in the previous section, the interaction between
theprivate and official valuation of foreign exchange, on the one hand, and
the role of the black market premium as a relative price, on the other, call
fora general equilibrium approach. In the model presented below, two
relative prices are endogously determined, the black market premium and the
relative price of non-traded goods. To sharpen the analysis, we will neglect
the role of the black market premium emphasized in the previous section,
namely determining whether a transaction will go through the official or
the black foreign exchange market. Here there are exports and imports which
either always traded through the official market, or always smuggled. Their
prices in foreign currency are, in obvious notation, XO' XB and P.
Assuming further that the given factors of production are fully employed, we
specify the five excess-supply functions for goods in terms of the vector
of domestic currency prices, P, and financial wealth, W.
(1) X.(P) -D.(P,W) =ES.(P,W) i =XO,MO, XB, NT,
where =xoMO XB MB NT
The elimination of the direct effect of asset returns on the demand for
goods, as well as of the income effect is designed to simplify the analysis.4-7-
For the same reason, demands for domestic money M and foreign exchange F
depend on the expected rate of change of the black market exchange rate, ,
asa measure of the real returns differential when nominal returns arezero,5
on the vector of goods prices and on wealth.
(2) eF =f(,P, W)
(3) M =m( )
(4)W =M+eF
The domestic money stock, in turn, is made up of domestic credit, C —
interpretedas lump-sum transfer from the government —andthe stock of
foreign assets of the (government), central bankFG, valued at the official
exchange rate:
(5)M= C+FG
This formulation takes as given the money multiplier or, equivalently,
assumes a stock demand for high—powered money.
Goingback to the excess-supply functions for goods, and expressing
6
them in terms of the price of the official export goo4 P0 =eP0weget,
fromzero homogeneity in prices and wealth:




The four relative prices which are the components of the p vector can
be expressed in terms of the terms-of-trade in the official and black
markets, the black market premium and the relative price of non-traded goods:-8-




If the terms of trade are given to the domesticeconomy, t0 and tB as well
as PQ/P8 are exogenous and can be set to one by choice of units.
Asset demands are linear homogenous in prices and wealth,7 whilethe
neglect of the effect of relative asset returns on the demand forgoods
implies that f =-inin (2) and (3) above. We can therefore substitute for
the demand for domestic money by using the wealth constraintand write port-
folio balance as:
(2') pF =f(),p, q, +pF)
where =
Wealso assume that the market for non-traded goods always clears:
(6) XNT(p, q) =D(p,q, W)
Givenasset stocks and the terms of trade, (2') and (6) determine the
twoendogenous relative prices p andq.Tothe extent that the official
exchangerate is fixed, or that its rate of change is determined by the
monetary authorities, furthermore, temporary equilibrium involves the adjust-
ment of e and NTInfact, given (6), it is clear that temporary equilibrium
requires e and NT to move at the rate of crawl, so that p andq are constant.
Now excess supply for traded goods equals the accuinlation offoreign
currency by the central bank and the private sector through the reported and-9-.
unreported trade balances respectively. We will allow for exogenous reported
capital flows, whose amount in foreign currency is T, an outflow. Then we







It is clear from (7) that when F =0in steady-state equilibrium, B0
so that the excess-supply of smuggled goods is zero. The relationshipsof the
reported trade balance to the change in domestic real money balances, stil.l
needs to be specified. Given (5), it will, require assumptions about credit
creation and the rate of crawl. Since we do not explicitly introduce a
government sector, there is only the endogenous source of money creation, the
excess supply of the official traded good. The exogenous components are the
reported capital flows, domestic credit creation, which are both transfers,
and capital gains on central bank reserves associated with changes in the
official exchange rate, to the extent that a fraction -y thereof induces
credit creation and 1 -ygoes into central bank net-worth forever. We can
then write:
(9) =+-T
where =- [ + (1-y) ]-
Itis clear from (9) that if y =0,as usually assumed,8 the expression
in square brackets equals one andbecomes the real increase in domestic
credit creation as a proportion of the money stock. Notice also that if
y =1and P;0 is given,becomes inversely proportional to the real money
stock, so that its level only enters through- 10.-
Finally, we specify for the moment an adaptive expectation formation
mechanism based on the level of the premium, so that
(10) =
Wewill refer below to the perfect foreign assumption
(11)
Using (10) in (6), setting P0 =1by choice of units and expressing
(2') and (6) as implicit functions of asset stocks and relative prices, we
canexpressthe temporary equilibrium of the system as:
(12) A(p, q, 1,F,z) =pF-f=0
(13) N(p, q, l,F,z) =
ESNT
=0
where =XB'XotB t0) is a vector of exogenous relative prices.
4. porary equilibrium
By log differentiation of (12) and(13)we solve the system for the two
endogenous relative prices, as a function of asset stocks and the vector
of exogenous prices. Denoting the matrix of (positive) elasticities of the






2 q (1 - \ F
where a =pF/Wis the share of foreign assets in wealth;— 11—
= isthe elasticity of demand for foreign assets with
respect to real wealth;
x is the positive elasticity of expectations relative to the
premium; 61(62 63) is the positive elasticity of demand for
foreign assets with respect to the premium (the relative price
of non-traded goods, relative returns), e.g. 6 = ;
2 IP
LfL
C = —C Ti;
1 1 3
=-WN/Wis the positive semi-elasticity of the excess supply
of non-traded goods with respect to real wealth;
( ) isthe positive semi-elasticity of the excess supply of 12
non-traded goods with respect to the premium (the relative price
of non-traded goods), e.g. v =-pN/3p -pN/Bp
1 2 2 3 3
It is clear from the left-hand-side of (14) that in q, q space the slope
of the N schedule is iffiambiguously positive whereas the A schedule could
slope downward if the valuation effect were weaker than the sum of the wealth
effect and the relative price effect (net of the regressive expectation effect).
Put another way, as the premium increases, demand of foreign assets increases
by less. Since a =f/and is the total elasticity of money demand
with respect to the premium, we can write this condition as:
(15)—>
1
If condition (15) is met, the premium varies inversely with the currency
ratio valued at the official rate, F/'4, and with a coefficient less than one,
so that if the premium increases, we know that the currency ratio valued at—12--
the black market rate, pF/M, will also increase. If marginal andaverage
currency shares are the same (n =1),furthermore, condition (15) puts the
share of domestic money in wealth as an upper bound on the premium elasticity,
net of expectations effects.
In a partial equilibrium framework where price and wealth effects are
neglected, then, the A schedule would be horizontal.JTn general, to the
extent that relative price effects are stronger on the flow demand for goods
than on the stock demand for assets, the slope of the A schedule will be less
than the slope of the N schedule. To the extent that <1 -
furthermore,the slope will be less than the ray through the origin OR, as
drawn in Figure 2, where temporary equilibrium obtains at T. It is clear
from the Figure that an exogenous increase in i(notdue to a decrease in p),
by only moving up the A schedule, increases p by more than it increases q so
that the new equilibrium is atT. This result holds independently of the
slope of the A schedule.
The effects of changes in asset stocks are also straightforward. If the
slopes are as drawn, then the determinantof the Jacobian in (14) is positive
and domestic monetary expansion will increase both relative prices while an
increase in foreign money will decrease them. To see this solve (14) for
given z and write:
H (:14')
LJ-13-






A 2(l -) - + > 0
h=v2/l
- is the marginal currency ratio
is the ratio of the wealth semi-elasticity of excess
supply of non-traded goods to the wealth elasticity of demand
for foreign assets.
Note that F <requires that the ownpriceeffect dominate the demand for
non-traded goods or that the marginal currency ratio be sufficiently small.
It is clear from Figure 2, though, that if A moves up and N to the right or
conversely the new intersection might be the left or to the right of OR,
depending on the relative sizes of and and F and respectively.
Under our assumption that the slope of of the A schedule is less the p/q,
thedominance of the "own" effect in the non-traded-- goods market has to be
sufficienty strong for
(16) > + w1(1 —c
+62).
Ifcondition (16) holds, asset stocks will always have a stronger effect
on p than on q, so that after an increase in domestic (foreign) money the
system will move to TM (TF), to the left (right) of OR. If condition (16)















(17) v2 >v1 + (c1+E2) 1h
The effect of changes in the exogenous relative prices areeasy to




where EB (c0) is the elasticity of the demand for foreign assets with
respect to p3 (p1), respectively the inverse of the relevant terms
of trade;
and \(v0) isthe semielasticity of N with respect to
p(p1).
It is clear from the substitution of (18) into (14) and the use of
Cramer's rule that an increase in XB'XO (which alwaysappears multiplied by
p) increase p and q while increase in tB or t0 decrease p and q. The effect
on p will be stronger if V2issufficiently large. Tne exact condition for
the increase in the terms of trade t, i =B,0 to lower p/q is stronger than
(16) if \'./E.islarge:
(19) V2> aw + v + (1---
Thecondition for the increase in Ttoincrease p/q is weaker than (19):
(20) V2> aw1 + (1
-o.ii +3TF -c)
To consider the effect of a once-and-for-all devaluation of the official
rate, notic that it increases the demand for foreign currency by 1 -- £2
andincreases excess demand for non-traded goods by2-- w1,so that the
-- 16-
black market exchange rate and the price of non-traded goods rise. It can,
however, be shown that if L >0they will necessarily rise by less, so that
p and q fall. In fact, p/q will fall and the new equilibrium will be on or
below OR if condition (16) holds. An official devaluation would thus bring
the system from T to TF in Figure 2, just like when the stock of foreign
money increases. Note, finally, that an increase in the equilibrium ratio
of foreign money to wealth lowers the slope of the N schedule and increases
the slope of the A schedule.
5.Steady-state equilibrium
Still assuming regressive expectations about the change in the black
market rate, we investigate the properties of steady-state equilibrium,
defined by constant asset stocks= andFF*. These are such that,
aside from portfolio balance and equilibrium in the non-traded goods market,
there is zero excess supply of the smuggled good, so that B0 and therefore,
zero excess supply for the official traded good as well, =0.Asset accumu-
lation can thus be represented by solving out for p and q in the excess supply
function for traded goods. We express it as:
(21) M =(,F)+ - T
(22) F=B (m, F)
According to (21), when =0,domestic real money balances will not remain
constant. Setting =0in (9) above, we obtain a relationship between domes-
tic credit creation, the reported capital outflow and the rate of crawl which
has to be satisfied for the reported trade balance to imply a constant real
domstic money stock. It can be written as:
(23) ë =(C-'T)I(N-yFG)-17-
According to (23) the rate of crawl is determined by the difference between
the exogenous domestic credit creation andreported capital outflow,
over the money stock net of the fraction of central bankreserves which
induces credit creation. Thus if, as usuallyassumed, y0, the rate of
crawl will be lowest. If, conversely all capital gainsare monetized, the
denominator reduces to C.
If (23) holds, then the only net source of increase in domesticreal
money balances is indeed the excess-supply of the officially traded good:
(21') f=
supposenow that bothand T are zero but that the rate of crawl is determined
by the "acceleration hypothesis "described in Section 2 above. Then(21')
does not hold and we have instead:
(21") =(1+
Thetwo specifications have the same linear approximation. We wiii choose
(21') for simplicity andwill analyze the effect of an increase in domestic
creditcreation from a value which is exactly offsetby the rate of crawl
alongthe lines of (23). Under these conditions we can write thelinear




where()isthe positive semi—elasticity of the reported (unreported)
current account with respect to the premium,e.g. lf =—pB/Bp
1:1(p)is the positive semi—elasticity of the reported (unreported)
current account with respect to the relative price of non—traded
goods, e.g. i= —qB/q
3(w) is the positive semi—elasticity of the reported (unreported)
current account with respect to real wealth,e.g. =—WB/W
and ' , q are defined in (l4).
The determinant of the Jacobian in (25) is given by:
(26) DET =[w1l(fp4)+ V2(ü)+(A))+
(v1+aw1)(w—p)]
Itis dear from (26) that if the reported and unreported current
account have the same response to wealth and the relative price of the non—
traded good(so that A and p =ii)the determinant will be positive:
(26') DET =
(l-a)(f+7r)[T1w1+ >0
Under the same simplifying assumption, and if in addition n =1,the
trace will be given by:
(27) —TR =[v2(l-)+ 1c2j(+) + w —w1[E2(+w)
-p(l--1)] .
Notethat even when is at the upper bound given by condition 15),
and the term in p vanishes, if2 and are large relative to €2
and ,theexpression in (27) will be positive and the system will be stable
The condition for the owneffecton the unreported current account to be negative-19-
(B/F<0) is of course stronger than (27). It requires that thedirect
premium effect dominate the effect of the relative price of non—tradedgoods
and wealth:
(28) [2(1_a) +OLW1E2ITF> cw(2&1—\.1C2) + i[i(l—a) +cLwlr])
On the cross effects in (25), theone on the reported current account
(aB/F) is positive because and F are negative and!PFI > 1. For
> 0 ,howeverwe need
(29) T(1-a)[v2-c2w1}
>[(v21v1E2)+1] +
which is stronger than (28), but nevertheless plausible ifV2 and Tr are
large enough relative to w and
Under these conditions, the qualitative properties of steady-state
equilibrium will basically be the same as in a similar model without non-
traded goods and can be stated briefly.10 It can be shown thatnot sur-
prisingly —anincrease in the demand for foreign assets will increase h,
the currency substitution ratio, while a once-and-for-all devaluation of
the official rate will leave it unchanged. The effect of an increase in —
whichcan be interpreted when y =0and T =0either as an increase in
domestic credit creation or a decrease in the rate of crawl —isless
immediate and hinges more crucially on expectations formation mechanisms to
the extent that a change in the rate of crawl changes relative asset returns
in the steady-state, when the black market premium is constant. Taking the
total differential of the system from a situation where S =0,we can express
it as:- 20.-






it+ -ij (1-a)w j
HI - + cw —ti (1-a)w ctw F 0
L L L
Thedeterminant of the Jacobian in (30) simplifies to:
(31) DET =-(1-a) [ (w- + + ir) - w(ir - p)J
Assumingthat the expression in square brackets in (31) is positive,
andusingCramer?s rule, we find that an increase in S is likely to decrease
p and q, decreaseand increase F. The net effects on h and p/q are
given by:
(32) =[1-a(l+2)](2w -w1)-2c2(v1w + rw1)-( - 1)(p1
+
(33) (1 - - v1)-w1(it + p)]
Md3
Under the assumption about the relative size of the parameters used so
far, one would expect h to increase andto decrease in response to an
increase in 5.Thus an increase in domestic credit creation increases the
currency substitution ratio and causes an appreciation of the real black
markets rate (measured) in terms of non-traded goods). Conversely, an
increase in the rate of crawl reduces h and increases Theformer effect
is reversed when the expected increase in the premium generates an increase
in the demand for foreign assets, as shown in the next Section.-21-
6. The implications of perfect foresight
The well-known portfolio models of flexible exchange rates with non-
traded goods of Kouri (1975) and Calvo and Rodriguez (1977) assume that
expectations about relative returns are continuously realized. Using (11)
in (2') and inverting the portfolio balance equation, we obtain a differen-
tial equation for the black market rate:
(34) e =f(p. q, i,F)
While several methods of solution have been tried, the simpliest in
this case is to solve out for q, whose rate of change is given by the rate
of crawl, and express the system in terms of p. M and F. Taking a linear
approximation around steady-state equilibrium, where p =1by choice of
units, we write the system in matrix form as:
/ E)/E -(1-a)/c(1- -







Thedeterminant of the matrix in (31) is unambiguously positive and
equal to (1 -a)(T+)/c3, so that the system has the positive root asso-
ciated with the black market premium and two negative roots, associated with—22—
the asset stocks. Equilibrium is thus a saddle-point. Suppose now that
the rate of crawl increases. In steady-state the premium is constant, so
that the rate of depreciation of the black market rate was to increase.
This makes foreign currency more attractive and therefore raises the
currency substitution ratio. Because of (24), the rate of change of domes-
tic credit creation also increases.
We can represent equilibrium in state-space in a similar fashion to
the right panel of Figure 1 above by assuming that =atall times, so that
we plot the loci where p =0and F =0as in Figure 3)2 Steady-state equilibrium
obtains at F0. Asssuming thatis fixed, this differs from Figure 1 above
because the reported current account is always in balance and because the
unreported current account responds to wealth. As a consequence of the
wealth effect, the locus where F =0is upward sloping rather than horizontal.
The effect of an increase in the demand for foreign assets is now a smaller
jump in e, followed by a continuous appreciation of the black market rate
along with the perfect foresight path to F1. Conversely, the effect of an
exogenous increase in the foreign demand for the smuggled good is a downward
shift in the F =0locus, which leads to a jump appreciation in e and a
continuous appreciation along the new perfect foresight path to F2.-23-
Figure3
Steady-state




This paper has analyzed regimes of currency inconvertibility using the
portfolio approach to exchange rate determination, summarized (in a partial
context) in Section 1. We showed that the effect of relative prices on the
demandfor traded and non-traded goods had to dominate their effect on
asset demands. It was also shown under what conditions the steady-state
propertiesof the model were the same as the ones of a similar model with-
out non-traded goods. In particular, the result that continuous changes in
the official rate (a crawling peg) are necessary to change thecurrency
composition of private financial wealth, continues to hold. The direction
of the effect is different, however, under the assumption of perfect
foresight, because the increase in the rate of crawl implies an increase
in the expected rate of change of the black market rate, given that the
premium is constant in the long-run.-25-
NOTES
*Earlierversions were presented at INSEAD, Fontainebleau (France), at the
Third Latin American Regional Conference of the Econometric Society in
Mexico City (Mexico) and at the 95th Meeting of the American Economic
Association in New York. I am grateful to the participants, especially
AnaMartirena-Manteland Sweder van Wijnbergen, for comments. Remaining
errors are my own.
1. Empirical applications to Portugal and Egypt are in Macedo (1982a,
Essay III) and Macedo (1982b), respectively. Note that in Blejer (1978),
the existence of a non-traded good is required for the black market
rate to vary. A critical survey of his paper and of other black market
literature is in Macedo (1981).
2.The exact conditions are worked Out in Macedo (1982a, Essay II). On the
portfolio approach to dual exchange rates see references ibid.
3. See Kouri (1983).
4. On the income effect in this model, see Macedo (1981. p. 35 note 13).
In general, see Buiter and Eaton (1981).
5. This applies to relative real returns in the case of constant expenditure
shares. See Macedo (1981, p. 36 note 14).
6.The results could also be presented in terms of a price index. See note 9 below.
7.This contrasts with the assumption in Macedo (1982b). See, however,
Macedo (1981 and 1982a, p. 66 note 16 and p. 111).
..See,however, the addendum to Johnson (1976) and Macedo (;1981a, p. 67
note 18).-26-
9. If a price index IIP.3' was used theE.terms,call them ,wouldbe
subtracted by the weighted wealth effects(1 -a)rtimes +for





10. See the analysis in Macedo (l982a,p. 67-68).
11. The real appreciation is emphasized inMacedo (l982b).
12. This is somewhat arbitrary but finding theeigenvalues of the matrix
in (35) did not prove immediate and three-dimensionalphase diagrams
are not easy to interpret either.-27—
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